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Self-Presentation and Verbal Deception: Do Self-Presenters Lie More?

Robert S. Feldman, James A. Forrest, and Benjamin R. Happ
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

This study examined the effects of self-presentation goals on the amount and type of verbal deception used by participants in same-gender and mixed-gender dyads. Participants were asked to engage in a conversation that was secretly videotaped. Self-presentational goal was manipulated, where one member of the dyad (the self-presenter) was told to either appear (a) likable, (b) competent, or (c) was told to simply get to know his or her partner (control condition). After the conversation, self-presenters were asked to review a video recording of the interaction and identify the instances in which they had deceived the other person. Overall, participants told more lies when they had a goal to appear likable or competent compared to participants in the control condition, and the content of the lies varied according to self-presentation goal. In addition, lies told by men and women differed in content, although not in quantity.

Intuitive theories of self-presentation suggest that it is important to make a good first impression, and empirical data have shown that people actively manage their behavior to make positive first impressions (Godfrey, Jones, & Lord, 1986). One way that people may attempt to make themselves appear in a positive light is through verbal dissembling. Kashy and DePaulo (1996) found that deception is a standard component of everyday interactions, and that lies are told for a variety of reasons.

However, little is known about the circumstances under which people spontaneously lie, particularly in cases in which people attempt to present themselves in a specific manner. This study is an attempt to understand the relation between self-presentation strategies and the amount and type of deception that people engage in when they have a salient self-presentational goal.

SELF-PRESENTATION STRATEGIES

Jones and Pittman (1982) identified five self-presentational strategies: ingratiation, self-promotion, exemplification, intimidation, and supplication. Each of these strategies differs in the way an actor, or self-presenter, wishes a target to attribute the self-presenter's actions and behaviors.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Robert S. Feldman, Department of Psychology, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003. E–mail: feldman@psych.umass.edu

Research on self-presentation has focused on the differences in verbal (Godfrey et al., 1986) and nonverbal (Levine & Feldman, 1997) behaviors of people who attempt to ingratiate compared to those who attempt to self-promote, and the ensuing attributions of likability and competence that others make. For example, Godfrey et al. showed that people who self-promote engage in pro-active behavior, whereas people who ingratiate engage in reactive behavior. Researchers examining nonverbal behavior have found that when participants are given a goal to ingratiate or to appear likable, they nod, smile, and gesture to a greater extent than participants who are given a goal to avoid approval (Rosenfeld, 1966a, 1966b). Furthermore, a person's self-presentation goals of ingratiation and self-promotion affect his or her display of positive and negative emotions (Levine & Feldman).

Although considerable attention has been given to self-presentation strategies, relatively little work has investigated those circumstances that lead people to distort information and deceive another to make a good impression. Goffman (1959) referred to self-presentation as a creative process in which actors mold their outward behavior while taking into careful consideration the specific context and the target audience. Inherent in this view is the notion that self-presentation may, in some cases, lead to deception. In fact, the very nature of ingratiation and self-promotion may call for deception in certain circumstances. For example, job applicants who attempt to self-promote may exaggerate their abilities, and people seeking a potential dating partner

at a party may appear to agree with another person to appear likable.

Furthermore, people may lie differently according to particular normative and situational demands. For instance, in a diary study, DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, and Epstein (1996) found that men and women lie about the same amount, but they lie in different ways. Specifically, undergraduate men tell more self-oriented lies than undergraduate women do, and undergraduate women tend to lie to enhance another person. Furthermore, less intimate interactions are more likely to be plagued by lies than more intimate interactions. Similarly, DePaulo and Kashy (1998) found that people lie more and in different ways to strangers compared to friends. These studies show that people not only lie more or less depending on the situation, but also that the social context and other variables may affect the way people deceive others.

From this prior research, it is reasonable to assume that having a salient self-presentational goal will lead to an increase in the number of lies told by a person and that the type, content, and rationale for deceiving another individual should vary as a function of self-presentational strategies. Unlike previous studies that have employed retrospective diaries (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; DePaulo et al., 1996) or laboratory studies in which participants were directly instructed to lie (Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Forrest & Feldman, 2000), this study investigates self-generated lies identified just after the deception occurred.

Specifically, we investigate the relation between self-presentation goals of ingratiation and self-promotion, the amount of deception that self-presenters engage in, and the way they deceive. The study examines spontaneous deceptive events employing a paradigm similar to that used by Rosenfeld (1966a, 1966b) and Godfrey et al. (1986) in which a participant is given a specific goal (ingratiation, self-promotion, or a no goal control) prior to engaging in a short dyadic interaction.

We hypothesized that the quantity and nature of lies will vary depending on participants' self-presentational goals. Specifically, it is expected that participants with self-presentational goals of competence and likability, compared to participants with no specific self-presentational goal, will deceive more to present themselves in a more positive light. Furthermore, we hypothesize that the nature of the lies told by people in the different goal conditions will vary. Specifically, we hypothesize that people in the competence goal condition will tell more lies associated with competence (such as planning, achievement, and self-oriented lies). On the other hand, we expect that people with a goal to appear likable will tell more lies that promote their goal (lies about feelings and lies oriented to the other person). Finally, it is expected that gender differences will occur in the amount and nature of men and women's deceptions, consistent with the DePaulo et al. (1996) findings that men tell more self-oriented lies than women.

METHOD

Participants

A group of 121 pairs of undergraduate psychology students at a large state university were recruited to participate in this study. Of these 121 pairs, 27 were same-gender male dyads, 36 were same-gender female dyads, 30 were mixed-gender dyads where the self-presenter was a male participant, and 28 were mixed-gender dyads where the self-presenter was a female participant. For their participation, both the self-presenters and the partners received extra credit in their introductory psychology course.

Procedure

Two undergraduate experimenters (one male and one female) conducted each session. Pairs of unacquainted participants were scheduled to arrive in separate rooms at the start of the study, where one of the experimenters greeted each participant. Written instructions informed the participants that the purpose of the study was to examine how people interact when they meet someone new. They were then told that they would interact with another person for 10 min. After reading the instructions, participants completed several short questionnaires (not relevant to this study). Participants were randomly assigned to the self-presenter and partner condition, and each participant's interaction goal (likable, competent, or control) was manipulated in the written instructions to the self-presenter.

In the likable condition, the self-presenters were told that the researchers were interested in the ways that people act when they meet someone likable. They were asked to try to present themselves in a way that would make their partners think that they were very likable. In the competent condition, the self-presenters were told that the researchers were interested in the ways that people act when they meet someone competent. Participants were asked to "attempt to present yourself in a way that will make your partners think that you are very competent." Participants in both goal conditions were also told to "not let your partner know directly what are your goals for this session." In the control condition, the self-presenters were given no specific goal for the interaction. Rather, they were told to act as they normally would when they meet someone new. All the participants selected as partners of the self-presenter were given the same instructions as the control group.

After the instructions were read, the participants engaged in conversation for a period of 10 min. Participants knew that their conversation was being audiotaped, but they were unaware that the session was being covertly videotaped through a one-way mirror. Following the 10-min conversation, the dyads were separated to fill out questionnaires concerning the conversation. In addition, participants specified the goal

they had been asked to achieve during the conversation as a manipulation check. Following the manipulation check, the participants were made aware that their conversation had been secretly videotaped and consent was obtained to use the video-recordings for research, after which the partner was debriefed and dismissed.

The self-presenter was then told of the researcher's interest in deception and lies. The researcher provided examples of common lies, such as falsely agreeing with their partner or saying that they received an "A" on a test when they really had earned a "C." Participants were then asked to view the video of the conversation they had just engaged in and identify any lies that they told. The participants were also asked to write down what a more accurate statement would have been following every lie; this was done to corroborate whether what the participant identified as a lie was in reality a lie and to help in the coding of the lies. Participants were urged to record all lies, no matter how big or small. They were also told that if there was any question as to whether a particular statement qualified as a lie, that they should record it. After this exercise was complete, the participants were debriefed and dismissed.

Coding Scheme and Method of Analysis

After the data were collected, the lies were coded by two coders according to the DePaulo et al. (1996) coding scheme. The lies were coded according to content, rationale, and type using participants' descriptions of the lies and the explanatory statement that followed the record of deception. Interrater reliability was high, significantly different from chance (Content: $\kappa = .82$; Rationale: $\kappa = .75$; Type: $\kappa = .64$), and differences were resolved by consensus.

The primary design of the study was a 3 × 2 × 2 (Goal: Likable, Competent, Control × Gender of Self-Presenter × Gender of Partner) between-subjects factorial. The dependent measure in this analysis was the total number of lies told. Secondary analyses were conducted on the categorization of lies. In these analyses, lies were coded into subcategories, and the number of lies coded for each subcategory were analyzed as within-subject variables.

Inspection of the distribution of lies revealed that the data were distributed non-normally, which was to be expected because the data were frequency counts. Log transformation would not affect the shape of the distribution because there were no possible negative scores and there were too many zeros in the data. Because of the non-normal distribution of the number of lies identified by the participants, and concerns about sphericity and heterogeneity of variance, bootstrapping was used to test the sum of absolute differences from the grand mean of lies told by participants.

Bootstrapping is a statistical technique that builds the sampling distribution from the data. It is useful when the assumptions underlying a theoretical sampling distribution will not hold. Unlike traditional inference approaches, bootstrapping estimates the shape of a statistic's sampling distribution through the use of a large number of computer-generated computations (Mooney & Duval, 1993).

One important advantage of bootstrapping in the context of this study is that, by building a sampling distribution from the data, assumptions of normality become unnecessary. To carry out this procedure we followed the steps laid out by Mooney and Duval (1993), where we treated the data as the population of scores and constructed a probability distribution by assigning a probability of 1/n for each data point. In this study, each data point had a probability of 1/121. For example, there were 49 persons who did not lie, so there are 49 zeroes, 23 ones, 18 twos, and so on. If the test involved a within-subjects factor, the probability distribution changed to $1/n_x$, where n_x is the number of within-subjects data points.

The second step was to draw a random sample with replacement. The size of this sample is the same size as the actual number of data points. The third step was to calculate the statistics of interest. In this case, the statistic used to measure differences between groups was $SB = \Sigma | x_i - \mu |$, where x_i is the mean for a group and μ is the grand mean. An *SB* of zero indicates no deviation from the mean, and consequently that all group means are equal; a high *SB* indicates greater variability in the means of the groups (Simon & Bruce, 1991; Simon, 1985). When an interaction was tested, the absolute value of *SB* was higher than main effects tests because there were more data points to be considered.

The fourth step was to repeat steps two and three 1,000 times, which is the standard number of resamples necessary to accurately estimate confidence intervals around a statistic, according to Efron and Tibshirani (1986).

After these steps were followed, we were able to construct a bootstrapped estimate of the sampling distribution of *SB*, by assigning a probability of 1/B at each point in the resample. The value of *B* was the number of times the sample was drawn, which in this case was 1,000. Because there was little difference between the estimated value of *SB* and the expected value of *SB*, there was no reason to correct bias in the estimate.

RESULTS

Manipulation Check

Self-presenters were asked at the end of the session to identify the goal assigned to them for the session. As expected, almost all participants were aware of their assigned goal. Specifically, for the likable condition, 93% of the participants reported that their goal was to seem likable to their partner. For the competent condition, 95% of the participants correctly identified competence as their goal. In the control con-

dition, 78% of the participants reported that their goal was to simply get to know their partner and 17% stated that they had no goal for the conversation.

Overall Incidence of Lying

The 3 × 2 × 2 (Goal × Gender of Self-Presenter × Gender of Partner) between-subjects bootstrap analysis found that the average number of lies per 10-min session was 1.75, ranging from 0 lies to 12 lies. Forty percent of the self-presenters reported telling no lies in the session. For those participants who did report lying, the average number of lies was 2.92.

There was an overall effect for self-presentation goal, in which participants in the likable and competent condition told significantly more lies (M = 2.02 and 2.37, respectively) than people in the control condition (M = .88), SB = 1.77, p < .001, η^2 = .08.[1] A nonparametric post hoc Mann–Whitney U test revealed that self-presenters in the likable and competent goal conditions did not differ significantly from each other in the number of lies told, U = 718, p > .05. On the other hand, participants in both self-presentation conditions told significantly more lies than participants in the control condition (likable – control: U = 469, p < .01; competent – control: U = 461, p < .01).

Content of Verbal Lies

Three different coding schemes were used to analyze the content, type, and rationale for the lies (see Table 1 for a summary of the coding scheme and Table 2 for the correlations among the different types of lies). In the first coding scheme, the lies that participants told were coded according to their content regarding whether the lies involved feelings, plans, achievements, facts, or explanations. Thus the design was a 3 × 2 × 2 × 5 (Goal × Gender of Self-Presenter × Gender of Partner × Content of Lie) factorial, with within-subjects as the last factor.

There was a significant difference in the content of lies, SB = .82, p < .01, η^2 = .13.[2] Lies concerning feelings were very common (M = .75), followed by achievement lies (M = .34), fact lies (M = .31), plan lies (M = .25), and finally, explanation lies (M = .06). A Wilcoxon nonparametric test, which tests whether related variables are from the same population, showed that the number of lies about feelings are significantly greater than all other lies (Feel-Achieve Z = 3.14, p < .05; Feel-Plan Z = 4.08, p < .05; Feel-Explanation Z = 5.62, p < .05; Feel-Facts Z = 3.24, p < .05). This finding replicates the results of the DePaulo et al. (1996) study, where it was also found that the content of feelings in lies were more common than other contents such as plans, facts, an so forth. There was also significant Goal × Content of Lie interaction, SB = 2.27, p < .01, η^2 = .06 (see Table 3). Post hoc analysis of the means reveals that participants in the likable and competent condition told more lies concerning feelings than people in the control condition, U = 469, p < .01 and U = 532.50, p < .01, respectively. In addition, people in the competent goal condition told significantly more plan lies than people in the control, U = 511, p < .01, and the likable goal condition, U = 588.50, p < .05.

This last interaction was qualified by a Content × Goal × Gender interaction, where the number of feeling and planning lies told by men and women differed, SB = 5.35, p < .05, η^2 = .01 (see Figure 1). Post hoc analysis of the means reveals that men in the likable condition told more lies con-



FIGURE 1 Types of lies told by women and men in the control, likeable, and competent conditions.

[1]Effect sizes (η^2) are derived from analyses of variance and should be viewed as approximate, given the non-normal distribution of the data.

[2]The main effect analysis for content of lie, as well as all other main effects for coded lies, used a bootstrap statistic similar to that used for the between-subjects analyses. One difference between the two statistics is that the mean number of lies for each category is subtracted from the grand mean of lies told divided by the number of categories. Therefore, $SB = \Sigma \mid x_I - \mu/i \mid$ where i is the number of categories the lies were coded into. For interactions involving the categories of lies, $SB = \Sigma \mid x_{ij} - \mu_i \mid$ where x_{ij} is the mean of number of coded lies for a specific condition and μ_i is the mean number of lies per category. By using this statistic, the p value for interactions using number of coded lies is not overestimated.

TABLE 1
Taxonomy of Lies

Coding	*Definition*
	Content of lie
Feelings	Lies about affects, emotions, opinions, and evaluations.
Achievement	Lies about achievements, accomplishments, knowledge, and so on.
Actions, plans	Lies about what the liars did, are doing, plan to do, where they are.
Explanations	Lies about liars' reasons or explanations of their behavior.
Facts	Lies about facts, objects, events, people, or possessions.
	Rationale for lie
Self-oriented	Lies told to protect or enhance the liars or advantage liars interests.
Other-oriented	Lies told to protect or enhance others or advantage other's interests.
	Type of lie
Outright	Total falsehoods.
Exaggerations	Lies in which liars overstate the facts, or convey an impression that exceeds the truth.
Subtle	Lying by evading or omitting relevant details. Also behavioral and white lies.

Note. More detailed definitions are found in DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, and Epstein (1996).

cerning feelings than any other type of lie in the likable, competent, or control condition ($U > 352$, $p < .05$, for tests involving feeling lies told by men in the likable condition.) On the other hand, women told significantly more lies concerning feelings in both the competent and likable conditions ($U > 339$, $p < .05$, for tests involving feeling lies told by women in the likable or competent conditions).

Outright Lies, Subtle Lies, and Exaggerations

An additional bootstrap analysis was conducted on the data coded according to whether lies were outright, subtle, or exaggerations. The results of the 3 × 2 × 2 × 3 (Goal × Gender of Self-Presenter × Gender of Partner × Type of Lie) analysis showed a trend for the type of lie main effect, $SB = .57$, $p = .10$, $\eta^2 = .08$. Overall, more outright lies ($M = .87$) were told by participants than subtle lies ($M = .51$) or exaggerations ($M = .38$). There was also a significant interaction between the type of lie and the self-presentational goal of the participant, $SB = 1.75$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .01$. Post hoc tests show that participants in the likable condition told significantly more outright lies ($M = 1.03$) and exaggerations ($M = .50$) than people in the control condition; outright = .58, $U = 583$, $p < .05$; exaggerations = .15, $U = 578$, $p < .01$. People in the competent condition told a mean of 1.03 outright lies and .50 exaggerations, but they did not differ significantly from the other groups, $U = 78$, $p = ns$. In addition, people in the competent condition ($M = .84$) told more subtle lies than did people in the control condition ($M = .18$), $U = 533$, $p < .01$, but people in the competent and control conditions did not differ from the likable condition ($M = .53$) in the number of subtle lies told.

In addition, the gender of the participant was related to the type of lies told. A Type of Lie × Gender interaction showed that men and women differed only in the number of outright lies told, $SB = 1.19$, $p < .01$. Post hoc tests show that men told significantly more outright lies than women ($M = 1.32$ men; $M = .51$ women), $U = 1375.50$, $p < .05$. The mean number of subtle lies told by men ($M = .34$) and women ($M = .65$), and the mean number of exaggerations told men ($M = .34$) and women ($M = .42$) did not differ significantly from each other, $U = 120$, $p > .05$. Finally, a Type × Gender × Partner interaction showed that men told significantly more outright lies to women ($U = 531$, $p < .05$), and women told significantly fewer outright lies to men ($U = 478$, $p < .05$), $SB = 2.75$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .01$ (see Figure 2).[3]

Self-Oriented Versus Other-Oriented Lies

A final analysis examined the coding of lies according to the rationale for the lie; that is, whether the lie was self-oriented versus other-oriented. The Goal × Rationale interaction was significant, $SB = 1.77$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .01$, where people in the control condition told significantly fewer number of self-oriented lies ($M = .70$) than participants in the competent condition ($M = 1.58$), $U = 572.5$, $p < .05$, and participants in the likable condition ($M = 1.20$), $U = 503.5$, $p < .05$. There was also a difference in the number of other-oriented lies told by participants in the three goal conditions. Participants in the control condition told an average of .18 other oriented lies, compared to participants in the competent condition ($M = .79$), U

[3] A four-way interaction was tested and found to be significant, but the results are not reported because several of the cells had a frequency count of zero, meaning there was no variance in those cells, and raising doubt about the appropriateness of testing the four-way interaction.

TABLE 2
Correlation Matrix for Lies and Lies Coded According to Type, Content, and Rationale

	Content				*Rationale*			*Type*		
	Feel	*Achieve*	*Plan*	*Explain*	*Fact*	*Self*	*Other*	*Outright*	*Subtle*	*Exaggeration*
Feel	1.00	.28*(.23*)	.31*(.09)	.14(.09)	.03(.07)	.42*(.35)	.75*(.79*)	.46*(.33*)	.59*(.52*)	.45*(.64*)
Achieve		1.00	.37*(.29*)	.21*(.28*)	.28*(.48*)	.58*(.79*)	.25*(.18*)	.59*(.77*)	.32*(.21*)	.20*(.32*)
Plan			1.00	–.02*(–.06)	.06(.14)	.54*(.45*)	.25*(.08)	.54*(.47*)	.21*(.16)	.21*(.07)
Explain				1.00	.20*(.30*)	.29*(.44*)	.07(–.01)	.11(.28*)	.34*(.13)	.21*(.27*)
Fact					1.00	.48*(.70*)	.02(.08)	.34*(.64)	–.02(.44*)	.45*(.07)
Self						1.00	.22*(.09)	.64*(.85*)	.32*(.52*)	.53*(.24*)
Other							1.00	.39*(.24*)	.67*(.26*)	.27*(.75*)
Outright								1.00	.19*(.22)	.25*(.13)
Subtle									1.00	.17*(.15)
Exaggeration										1.00
Overall[a] *M* (*SD*)	.75(1.24)	.34 (.85)	.25 (.56)	.06 (.27)	.31 (.71)	1.15 (1.84)	.59 (1.12)	.87 (1.52)	.51 (.99)	.38 (.76)

Note. $n = 118$. Values outside parentheses indicate Kendall's Tau-b correlation for nonparametric data and values inside parentheses indicate Pearson's correlation.
[a]Values outside parentheses indicate mean number of lies and values inside parentheses indicate standard deviation.
*$p < .05$.

TABLE 3
Mean Number of Lies Coded for Content of Lie by the Self-Presentational Goal

	Control	*Likable*	*Competent*
Type of Lie			
Feeling	.27[a]	1.05[b]	.95[b]
Achievement	.22[a]	.28[a]	.53[a]
Plans	.05[a]	.18[a]	.55[b]
Explanation	.03[a]	.10[a]	.05[a]
Facts	.27[a]	.42[a]	.24[a]

Note. n = 40 for the Control and Likeable groups; n = 38 for the Competent group. Contrasts shown are between goals for each of the dependent variables. Different superscripts indicate statistically significant differences (based on Mann–Whitney U statistic) between the groups.

TABLE 4
Self Versus Other-Oriented Lies as a Function of Self-Presentational Goal and Deceiver's Gender

	Men		*Women*	
Goal	*Self*	*Other*	*Self*	*Other*
Control	1.11[b]	.21[a]	.33[a]	.14[a]
Likable	1.50[b]	1.00[b]	.95[b]	.68[b]
Competent	1.81[b]	.44[b]	1.41[b]	1.05[b]

Note. Different superscripts indicate statistically significant differences (based on Mann–Whitney U statistics) between the groups.
$p < .05$.



FIGURE 2 Types of lies told by men and women to their partners.

= 582.5, $p < .05$, whereas participants in the likable condition told a mean of .83 about the other, U = 539.5, $p < .05$.

Finally, a significant Goal × Gender × Rationale interaction (SB = 5.27, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .01$; see Table 4) showed that women tell about the same number of self and other oriented lies within each of the goal conditions, U = 112.5, $p = ns$, but men tell more self-oriented lies compared to other-oriented lies, especially when men have the goal to appear competent or were in the control condition, U = 588.5, $p < .05$; U = 478, $p < .05$, respectively.

DISCUSSION

Consistent with the idea of the pervasiveness of deception in everyday life (DePaulo et al., 1996), the majority of the participants told some type of lie in their conversation. Over 60% of the participants admitted to using verbal deception when speaking with their partners. The number of lies told per session ranged from none to as many as 12 lies.

Overall, the pattern of the results was as expected. More lies were told when participants had an ingratiation or competence goal for the session compared to no specific goal for the interaction. In addition, self-presentation goals were related to the content, the type of lie, and the rationale for the lie being told. Specifically, people (especially men) in the competence condition told more self-oriented lies and lies about plans and achievements. People in the likable condition tended to tell more outright lies and exaggerations, and more lies about feelings.

As discussed previously, self-presentational goals have been investigated as possible moderators in the communication of nonverbal behaviors and impression management (Jones & Pittman, 1982; Levine & Feldman, 1997). It seems from the current findings that self-presentational style increases the demand to engage in impression management, and, in turn, increases the likelihood of lying. Furthermore, the lies told by people in the two self-presentational goal conditions show that different goals have a different effect on the content, type, and rationale of the lies told. Specifically, people in the competent goal condition compared to people in the likable goal condition told more lies about what they were doing, did, or were planning to do. People with a competence goal seemed to direct the conversation to issues that might enhance the way they were perceived, and in doing so, misrepresented themselves by telling a significantly higher number of planning and achievement lies, and self-oriented lies.

Of course, an alternative hypothesis is possible. There might have been the perception by the participants in the two goal conditions that lies were sanctioned by the experimenter, although this might not be the case in the control condition. Although this explanation cannot be ruled out definitely, it seems unlikely based on postexperimental debriefing, in which participants indicated no differential perception that lying was sanctioned according to condition.

Gender was also a factor that was associated with the way lies were told. Replicating the results of DePaulo et al. (1996), men told more self-oriented lies than women. This difference was particularly evident when men had female partners. These results suggest, perhaps contrary to popular belief, that men do not lie more than women or vice versa, but that men and women lie in different ways. Specifically, the reason why men and women lie is different. This result is in line with the idea that men tend to self-promote when engaging in a conversation (Maccoby, 1990), whereas women tend to have affiliative interactions (Erwin, 1993). Further research should investigate this hypothesis.

The pattern of results provides initial evidence regarding the relation between self-presentational goals and deception patterns. People's goals affected the number and type of lies they told, presumably employing deception to achieve the goals of the interaction.

It is important to keep in mind that 60% of the participants lied during the 10-min conversation, and did so an average of almost three times. It is hard to imagine that people lie almost three times per 10 min during most social interactions. The large number of lies told might be related to the awkwardness of having to speak with a stranger for a period of time in a laboratory setting. For lack of anything better to say, it is possible that participants embellished, or even invented stories to pass the time. Outside the laboratory, people have the ability to end a conversation that they find boring or awkward.

It is also important to remember that about 40% of the participants claimed to have told no falsehoods. As with any self-report measure, including diary studies, these data need to be considered with caution because the number of lies might actually be higher if we consider that some of the participants may have been lying about not lying, and did not report all or any of their lies.

In addition, the study did not investigate whether there were any differences in the nonverbal behaviors exhibited by participants in each goal condition when they lied compared to when they did not lie. It is possible that self-presentation goals will influence people's nonverbal behaviors when they are not telling the truth, and in turn, targets may notice these nonverbal behaviors and detect deception more easily.

Despite these limitations, the methodology used in this study complements and extends the results found in diary studies on deception. Furthermore, it provides a method for manipulating situational and motivational factors in an experimental setting, which may be impossible to achieve in diary studies.

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