

ABSTRACTS

SCOTT F. AIKIN

'KNOWLEDGE IS TRUE BELIEF' REBUTTED

Crispin Sartwell has argued that knowledge is merely true belief. The two arguments for this thesis are (1) from counter-examples to third requirements for knowledge and (2) from a dilemma for justification-theorists. I will show that the purported counter-examples are inconclusive because they do not reflect an informal pragmatic element of knowledge-attribution. The dilemma is inconclusive, because one horn is easily graspable. Further, I will refine Lycan's argument that the thesis that knowledge is true belief is inconsistent with epistemic modesty.

Keywords: knowledge, justification, epistemic minimalism, Crispin Sartwell, William Lycan

DAVID MARTENS

KNOWLEDGE, TRUE BELIEF, AND VIRTUOUS FALLIBILISM

I rebut a complex ad hominem argument against the thesis that true belief is sufficient for knowledge. According to the argument, the insufficiency of true belief for knowledge is guaranteed by our epistemic obligation not to think of ourselves as infallible. My rebuttal seeks clarity about the precise content of that obligation and emphasizes the variety of ways in which that thesis can be affirmed. Though I do not offer any positive argument for the sufficiency of true belief for knowledge, I think the thesis is creditable for being consistent with truths about our epistemic obligations.

Keywords: belief, knowledge, epistemic obligation, epistemic virtue, fallibilism

SAM HILLIER

ANALYTICITY AND LANGUAGE ENGINEERING IN CARNAP'S *LOGICAL SYNTAX*

One of the most important events in early analytic philosophy was the analyticity debate between Carnap and Quine. By analyzing this debate, much can be learnt about Carnap's logical empiricism at the time of *Logical Syntax*. This distinction is in many ways central to Carnap's philosophy, so his defense of it should be illuminating. I will critically discuss two interpretations of Carnap's defense of analyticity, and conclude that while each interpretation does capture a significant portion of Carnap's major philosophical project, neither interpretation on its own can be considered as a complete and satisfactory picture of Carnap's logical empiricism. In their place, I propose an entirely new way to see Carnap's logical empiricism which maintains the positive points of the previous views but avoids their pitfalls, and which also contains a response to Quine's challenges.

Keywords: Rudolf Carnap, Willard Van Orman Quine, analyticity, logical syntax, logical empiricism

CARLO PENCO

ESSENTIALLY INCOMPLETE DESCRIPTIONS

In this paper I offer a defence of a Russellian analysis of the referential uses of incomplete (mis)descriptions, in a contextual setting. With regard to the debate between a unificationist and an ambiguity approach to the formal treatment of definite descriptions (introduction), I will support the former against the latter. In **1.** I explain what I mean by "essentially" incomplete descriptions: incomplete descriptions are context dependent descriptions. In **2.** I examine one of the best versions of the unificationist "explicit" approach given by Buchanan and Ostertag. I then show that this proposal seems unable to treat the normal uses of *misdescriptions*. I then accept the challenge of treating *misdescriptions* as a key to solving the problem of context dependent descriptions. In **3.** I briefly discuss Michael Devitt's and Joseph Almog's treatments of referential descriptions, showing that they find it difficult to explain *misdescriptions*. In **4.** I suggest an alternative approach to DD as contextuals, under a normative epistemic stance. Definite descriptions express (i) what a speaker *should* have in mind in using certain words in a certain context and (ii) what a normal speaker *is justified* in saying in a context, given a common basic knowledge of the lexicon. In **5.** I define a procedure running on contextual parameters (partiality, perspective and approximation) as a means of representing the role of pragmatics as a filter for semantic interpretation. In **6.** I defend my procedural approach against possible objections concerning the problem of the boundaries between semantics and pragmatics, relying on the distinction between semantics and theory of meaning.

Keywords: context-dependence, definite descriptions, semantics-pragmatics distinction, Bertrand Russell

ATTILA TANYI

REASON AND DESIRE: THE CASE OF AFFECTIVE DESIRES

The paper begins with an objection to the Desire-Based Reasons Model. The argument from reason-based desires holds that since desires are based on reasons (first premise), which they transmit but to which they cannot add (second premise), they cannot themselves provide reasons for action. In the paper I investigate an attack that has recently been launched against the first premise of this argument by Ruth Chang. Chang invokes a counterexample: affective desires. The aim of the paper is to see if there is a way to accommodate the counterexample to the first premise. I investigate three strategies. I first deal with the idea that the motivation for the premise may be the thesis that an action is intentional if and only if it is done under the guise of perceived reasons. This offers us a way of defending the premise: by showing that actions prompted by affective desires are not intentional. I, however, argue that this strategy is unworkable. This brings me to the second strategy. Here I consider the idea that the premise does not require a conscious normative thought on the part of the agent; in fact, it may not require any such thought, conscious or unconscious. I claim that this strategy too is a failure. Finally, the third approach builds normative judgment in the desire. This is the approach that I think works; in particular, recent work by Jennifer Hawkins may help us accommodate affective desires. The challenge of affective desires, I conclude, can be tackled.

Keywords: Ruth Chang, affective desires, reasons for action, intentionality, responsiveness to reasons, Jennifer Hawkins