The interpersonal communication of emotional states is fundamental to both everyday and clinical interaction. One's own and others' affective experiences are frequent topics of everyday conversations, and how well these emotions are expressed and understood is important to interpersonal relationships and individual well-being. Similarly, in therapeutic contexts, progress depends on, among other things, how articulately the client expresses his or her emotions and how well the therapist understands and responds to these expressions. In this volume we take an interdisciplinary approach to understanding the verbal communication of emotion in a variety of contexts.

All languages provide speakers with an array of verbal strategies for conveying emotions. In English, for example, we have an abundance of both literal (e.g., irked, angry, furious), and figurative (e.g., flipping one's lid, blow a gasket) expressions which can be used to describe a theoretically infinite number of emotional states (e.g., Bush, 1973; Clore, Ortony, & Foss, 1987; Davitz, 1969; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Ortony, Clore, & Foss, 1987). Studies of language use in psychotherapy likewise are replete with examples of literal and figurative expressions for emotions (e.g., Angus, 1996; Davitz, 1969; Davitz & Mattis, 1964; Ferrara, 1994; Karp, 1996; McMullen & Conway, 1996; Pollio & Barlow, 1975; Siegelman, 1990).

This book pulls together new research and theory on the verbal communication of emotions by an international, cross-disciplinary group of recognized experts in affective communication, with the goal providing readers with a comprehensive view of current research and fertilizing cross-disciplinary interaction. Topics include analyses of literal and figurative expressions for emotions, studies of the use of metaphor and other figurative expressions for emotion, analysis of the role of conversational partners in creating emotional meaning, and the effects of culture on emotional communication. In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I first describe the scope of the book; then, I briefly summarize the chapters in each section of the book; finally, I describe several themes and issues that arise throughout the book and outline some areas for future research.

The Scope of the Book

The field of emotional communication is very large, and comprehensive coverage of all approaches to this topic would far exceed the page limits of this book. In this section I briefly describe the way the scope of the volume was restricted.

Verbal Communication of Emotions.

First, we have limited contributions to those which deal explicitly with the verbal communication of emotions. It is well established that humans use a wide range of nonverbal and paralinguistic mechanisms to express emotion, including facial expressions, gestures, posture, tone of voice, and the like. Over the past several decades, substantial progress has been made in understanding how emotions are expressed through these nonverbal mechanisms (see, e.g., papers in Barrett, 1998; Ekman and Davidson, 1994, Feldman & Rime, 1991; Philippot, Feldman, & Coats, 1999; Russell & Fernandez-Dols, 1997; Scherer & Ekman, 1984).

Important as these modalities are, however, paralinguistic and nonverbal channels in and of themselves are insufficient for expressing the full range of human emotional experiences for several reasons. First, although nonverbal cues can indicate what general class of emotions a person is feeling, they typically do not provide detailed information about that person's
emotional state. By seeing that someone is crying, for instance, we might assume that they are sad; by the extent of sobbing we might even be able to infer the intensity of the sadness. But the tears in and off themselves provide no information about the particular experience of sadness -- for example, the cognitions that go along with the sadness (e.g., "I have no money" vs. "I'm lonely") or the circumstances that lead up to feeling sad (e.g., "I lost my job" vs. "my dog just died"). As the contributions to this book show, verbal descriptions of emotional states can provide quite precise information about the specific form of an emotion, such as anger, depression, or happiness, that a person is experiencing.

In addition, there is a range of circumstances under which people talk about emotions that occurred in the past. As Rime (this volume) shows, people often talk about their past emotional experiences with friends and family. Past experiences are also a major topic of discussion in therapeutic contexts, in self-help groups, and other specialized settings. Furthermore, people talk about others' emotional experiences -- people they know, public figures, characters in books and movies, and the like (e.g., Fussell & Moss, 1998). In all these cases, people are communicating about emotions and feelings they are not personally experiencing at the time of the conversation, or at least not experiencing with the same intensity as the original event. Because many nonverbal behaviors are signs rather than intentional signals of emotional state, they have limited value in communicating about emotions one is not experiencing at the time of communication.

**Interdisciplinary Approach**

Second, the volume takes an explicitly interdisciplinary approach. Valuable insights into the verbal communication of emotion have come from workers in a number of fields, including linguistics, conversational analysis, ethnomethodology, sociolinguistics, anthropological linguistics, communications, and social, cognitive, and clinical psychology (see, e.g., papers in Andersen & Gueerero, 1998; Athanasiadou & Tabakowska, 1998; Niemeier & Dirven, 1997; Russell, 1987). Each of these areas, through its theoretical and empirical approach, offers
unique insights into affective communication. The interdisciplinary foundation of the book is evident in several interrelated aspects of the contributions: the level of analysis used to examine verbal phenomena, the author's empirical approaches, and the context of their investigations.

*Multiple levels of analysis.* The contributors focus on emotional expression at several different levels of analysis. Some focus on specific linguistic devices such as the literal emotional lexicon (e.g., English terms such as *angry, sad, happy* and the like) and/or the use of conventional metaphors, idioms, and other figures of speech (e.g., *hit the roof, down in the dumps, on Cloud 9*). Others examine descriptions of emotions in actual conversations, looking at, among other things, the creation of novel metaphors for emotions. Yet others examine language use at a dialogue level, considering how the emotion is expressed through a series of utterances, looking at the partners' influence, and so forth. Finally, some contributors look at verbal descriptions of emotions over a series of interactions, noting how these descriptions may change with repeated discussion of the emotional incident.

*Multiple empirical approaches.* The contributors also vary in the methodologies they use to approach their subject. The linguistically-oriented contributors analyze the meaning and use of conventional expressions for emotions. They consider, for example, how literal and figurative expressions for emotion concepts are expressed in different languages. Other contributors combine quantitative and qualitative analyses of naturally-occurring descriptions of emotions, for example by counting and classifying the number of metaphorical emotion phrases in a dialogue corpus. Contributors with a conversational analytic orientation take a purely qualitative approach, looking closely at how emotion are raised, responded to, and worked through by in segments of discourse. Lastly, some contributors take an experimental psychological approach, allowing them to have control over many of the factors hypothesized to influence the production and comprehension of affective language. Each of these approaches has its strengths and weaknesses. By bringing them together in one volume we hope to stimulate greater cross-disciplinary interaction that may lead to converging evidence about the verbal communication of emotions.
Multiple research settings. Finally, the contributors focus on how emotions are expressed in a variety of communicative settings. Those taking a linguistic approach consider emotional expressions in the abstract. Others study natural conversations between friends, relatives, and strangers. A number of chapters examine language use in psychotherapeutic contexts, building on previous work by Labov and Fanshel (1977), the contributors in Russell (1987), Siegelman (1990) and others. Finally, some authors pursue their research in the laboratory, where they can carefully control variables such as the number and characteristics of communicators, the topic of conversation, and so forth, to assess the effects of these variables on affective communication.

International group of contributors

Finally, I have tried to bring together an international group of contributors. As many of the contributions illustrate, the communication of emotions is shaped by language and culture in a variety of ways. To avoid creating theories that are too heavily rooted in the English language, contributions were solicited from investigators in a number of different countries (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Hungary, and the United State). Many of these contributors examine affective language in their own and other native languages in addition to English, thereby potentially broadening our scope of understanding.

It should be noted that space limits precluded the inclusion of chapters from every prominent researcher in each of the fields we have mentioned. Each contributor has provided an extensive reference section with pointers to other important research in their respective fields.

Overview of Chapters

Chapters are organized into three broad areas: background theory, figurative language use, and social/cultural aspects of emotional communication. Section I, Theoretical Foundations, consists of three chapters which look at fundamental issues in the verbal communication of emotion.
Cliff Goddard (Chapter 2, *Explicating Emotions Across Languages and Cultures: A Semantic Approach*) discusses a fundamental problem in the study of verbal communication of emotions: semantic differences across languages and cultures. For example, he observes that lexical terms in other languages that are roughly similar to our words *anger* and *depression* can have subtle differences in meaning. As a result, interpreting cross-cultural research on emotional language is problematic. He suggests that instead of glossing over semantic differences between languages, we consider them part of the phenomena to be investigated. Goddard takes an approach known as "natural semantic metalanguage" (NSM), originated by Wierzbicka (1992, 1999). In the NSM approach, word meanings are specified using a small set of universal semantic concepts (e.g., *people, good/bad, think, feel*). Unlike specific emotion terms, he argues, these semantic universals are found in all languages and thus can form metalanguage to describe specific emotion words in specific languages. In applying NSM to emotion terms, feelings associated with a specific emotion (e.g., "sadness") are linked to a typical cognitive scenario (e.g., "something bad has happened") using the semantic metalanguage. Goddard gives a variety of examples of how NSM can be applied to emotion terms in English and a number of other languages including Polish, Malayan, and Japanese. Next, Goddard turns his attention to cultural scripts about expressing emotions. He again applies the NSM strategy of using a small set of universal primitive features to characterize rules for expressing emotions in different cultures. Goddard's chapter is an elegant demonstration of the strengths of the NSM approach.

Sally Planalp and Karen Knie (Chapter 3, *Integrating verbal and nonverbal emotion(al) messages*) focus on how verbal and nonverbal cues to emotion might be theoretically integrated (see also Planalp, 1999). They observe that the complexity of this issue has lead to a "divide and conquer" strategy in which investigators tend to focus on individual cues (e.g., facial expressions, intonation, verbal messages) in isolation from the others. Although this strategy has lead to insights into emotional communication, it has not increased our understanding of how people integrate nonverbal and verbal cues when expressing and understanding emotions in actual conversations. Planalp and Knie outline O'Keefe's (1988) *Message Design Logics* and
explicate the implications of this model for integrating verbal and nonverbal cues to emotion. In *Expressive Logic*, emotions are viewed as entities that build up and escape or leak out of the body in various ways, including nonverbal behaviors, paralinguistic phenomena, and verbal utterances. In *Conventional Logic*, emotional messages are sent, via one or a combination of cues, to a receiver. The focus is on the channels used to send affective messages and the extent to which the recipient understands the message. In *Rhetorical Logic*, emotion and communication are viewed as activities oriented toward the achievement of social goals. Planalp and Knie describe in detail how different conceptualizations of communication affect researchers' choices of topics and paradigms used to investigate emotional communication.

In Chapter 4, *How to do Emotions with Words: Emotionality in Conversations*, Reinhard Fiehler outlines his approach to studying the relationship between emotion and language (Fiehler, 1990), in which emotions are viewed as by nature interactionally-constituted. Fiehler describes three types of emotion rules: *manifestation rules*, which govern the type of emotions and manner in which they are displayed in a particular situation; *correspondence rules*, which specify appropriate responses to others' emotions, and *coding rules* for identifying instances of emotions in an interaction. He distinguishes among the manifestation of emotions, the interpretation of emotions, and the interactional processing or negotiation of emotions. He also distinguishes between expressions of emotion and their thematization, or explicit verbalization, within the content of the conversation. Fiehler's model is noteworthy in several regards: First, he carefully considers a wide range of ways in which emotions may be communicated, including nonverbal behaviors, paralinguistic phenomena, word selections, conversational dynamics (e.g., interruptions and overlaps), and the like. Second, he describes in detail a number of verbal strategies for thematizing emotions, including verbal labels and descriptions, figurative expressions, and descriptions of circumstances surrounding an emotional event. He discusses how thematizations can focus on different elements in the emotional experience, including the experiencer, type and intensity of emotion and the dynamics of the experience. Third, Fiehler specifies a six-stage methodology for analyzing the relationship between emotion and
communication using his theoretical framework and then analyzes two excerpts from psychotherapy sessions to illustrate the value of his approach. Fiehler's model (explained in detail in his 1990 book) was translated into English specifically for this volume in order to make it more accessible to emotion researchers.

Section II, *Using Figurative Language to Express Emotions*, is comprised of four chapters that look at the role of metaphor and other figures of speech in emotional communication in both everyday language and psychotherapeutic contexts.

In Chapter 5 (*Emotion Concepts: Social Constructivism and Cognitive Linguistics*) Zoltán Kövecses sketches out his cognitive linguistic approach to the communication of emotion (e.g., Kövecses, 1996; 2000). He starts by contrasting the cognitive linguistic view of emotion language with that of Harre's "emotionology" (Harre, 1986). He notes that Harre and his fellow social constructivists have tended to focus on literal emotion terms such as *anger*, *joy* and *sadness*, and on terms for distinct emotions rather than classes of words for the same emotion (e.g., *angry*, *irate*, *irritated*). Kövecses then describes the cognitive linguistic approach, in which particular expressions for emotions are seen as reflecting deeper conceptual structures which are themselves metaphorical in nature and represent a folk theory of emotion (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Kövecses discusses at length, using many examples, how a large number of conventional metaphorical phrases for emotions (e.g., *burst with tears*, *flipped one's lid*) can be described in terms of an EMOTION AS FORCE conceptual metaphor. He argues that both causes and consequences of emotions are conceptualized metaphorically as forces. Kövecses provides examples showing striking similarities in the conceptual metaphors underlying emotional phrases in different languages and suggests this similarity might stem from similarities in how emotions are experienced in each of these cultures.

Gibbs, Leggitt, and Turner (Chapter 6, *What's Special about Figurative Language in Emotional Communication*) also address the role of metaphor and other figures of speech in emotional communication. Gibbs et al. first consider the nature of communicative intentions in metaphor production. They suggest that speakers may use metaphor to convey a variety of
subtle meanings, not all of which need have been consciously intended at the time of production. These subtle meanings allow speakers to describe their emotional experiences in more detail than would be possible using terms in the literal emotion lexicon. Like Kövecses, they argue that part of the communicative potential of metaphor stems from the relationship between a particular figurative expression and the deeper conceptual metaphor with which it is associated. Specific emotional metaphors can be seen as reflecting particular phases or aspects of larger conceptual metaphors (e.g., \textit{getting hot under the collar} vs. \textit{hit the roof}), and listeners use this relationship between the two in understanding metaphorical meaning. Gibbs et al. demonstrate in a series of laboratory studies how using different types of figurative language (e.g., irony, metaphor, overstatement, understatement) to express the same class of emotions (e.g., anger) lead different interpretations about speakers' intentions and emotional states (e.g., how angry the speaker is). Their findings suggest, among other things, that speakers can use figurative language strategically to express subtle nuances of emotional states.

The next two papers in this section focus specifically on metaphor use in psychotherapeutic contexts. In Chapter 7, \textit{Conflict, Coherence and Change in Brief Psychotherapy: A Metaphor Theme Analysis}, Lynne Angus and Yifaht Korman examine how spoken metaphors and the underlying metaphorical frameworks they represent change over the course of therapy. Angus and Korman suggest that metaphors used in psychotherapy reflect clients' views of themselves, their life circumstances, and the world. Client metaphors may also reflect the nature of the therapeutic relationship. By tracing metaphor use through a series of sessions between a particular client and therapist, they argue, one should be able to identify how clients' views change dynamically over time. To investigate their hypotheses, Angus and Korman analyzed all messages between two clients and their respective therapists over the course of fifteen or more sequential sessions. They examined the core metaphorical themes underlying clients' metaphors and other figures of speech as psychotherapeutic progress was made. In particular, they focus on the use of expressions falling under one theme, \textit{RELATIONSHIP AS CONFLICT}. Angus and Korman found that these metaphors based on this
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theme could be further classified into three subcategories: FIGHTING AND WINNING, FIGHTING BUT LOSING, and NEGOTIATING. They found that over the course of therapy, the subcategory of metaphorical phrases shifted from FIGHTING BUT LOSING to FIGHTING AND WINNING, although the progression was not linear. The findings highlight the importance of metaphor in therapeutic contexts and suggest that therapists might gain from paying closer attention to client's metaphors. The findings also provide a nice example of how the language people use to describe specific emotional events can change over time as their understanding of these events evolves through therapy.

In Chapter 8, Conventional Metaphors for Depression, Linda McMullen and John Conway focus on metaphors for depression. They first provide a historical perspective on the terms depression and melancholia and describe the historical bases for several conceptual metaphors for depression. They note that the conceptual metaphors of DEPRESSION IS DARKNESS and DEPRESSION IS WEIGHT date back to ancient Greece. McMullen and Conway draw upon data collected from a study of clients' depression-related metaphors during psychotherapy sessions to show the current pervasiveness of these two metaphors. In addition, they found a third conceptual metaphor, DEPRESSION IS DESCENT, accounted for more than 90% of the depression-related metaphors in their corpus. Clients described themselves as down, hitting a low, sinking, in the dumps, and the like. McMullen and Conway go on to show how the DEPRESSION IS DESCENT metaphor fits into a broader up-down spatial framework pervasive in Western cultures, in which "up" is associated with positive properties and "down" is associated with negative properties. Interestingly, they suggest that the very act of speaking about depression via metaphors that fall within the DEPRESSION IS DESCENT conceptual framework, because of its inherent negativity in Western cultures, might serve to worsen client's feelings of worthlessness and despair.

Section III, Social and cultural processes in emotional communication, brings together four chapters that look at ways emotions are embedded in larger socio-culture processes.
Rime, Corsini, and Herbette (Chapter 9, *Emotion, Verbal Expression, and the Social Sharing of Emotion*) look at emotional communication from a somewhat different angle than the previous chapters. Rime et al. study when and why people choose to share their emotional experiences with others after they have occurred. The stress is on patterns of sharing, rather than on the specific words used to share an experience. Rime and his collaborators have conducted a large series of studies of the dynamics of social sharing, beginning with studies of people's autobiographical accounts of sharing and moving to laboratory experiments in which they cleverly manipulate the type of emotional experience a participant undergoes and measure the extent to which this experience is shared with others. A number of notable findings have resulted from this body of work, including the repeated findings that people share the vast majority of their emotional experiences, often very soon after they occur, that they often share these experiences with more than one other person, and that they are especially likely to share more intense emotions. They find that personality characteristics have little effect on the extent of sharing, but that there are gender, age, and culture-related differences in sharing patterns. Also of note was the observed prevalence of secondary sharing, wherein the original recipient of sharing passes the emotion experience on to a third party. Rime et al. discuss the possible psychological and social functions of sharing emotions, including keeping a community up to date on the experiences of its members, and allowing the sharer to work through his/her experiences and search for meaning for emotional events.

In Chapter 10, *The language of fear: The communication of intergroup attitudes in conversations about HIV and AIDS*, Pittam and Gallois examine the language used to express fear, with a focus on language about fears rather than expressions of imminent fear. Their approach (see also Gallois, 1993) is rooted in Tajfel's (1982) Social Identify Theory and other theories of the effects of social category membership on perceptions of oneself and others. Pittam and Gallois observe that the way AIDS has spread among certain social groups (e.g., male homosexuals, intravenous drug users, prostitutes) has made social group memberships especially salient in any discussions about this highly-feared illness. Pittam and Gallois focus on one social
category, gender, that they posit is salient in AIDS-related discussions. They present a study of single- and mixed-gender groups discussing the HIV/AIDS situation and safe sex. Content analysis was used to examine all the fear-related words (e.g., worry, scare, shock, fear) generated in the discussions. They analyzed the linguistic data in terms of what is feared, who fears, and who is feared, and found that outgroups were often implicitly mentioned in discussions of who was feared. The results illustrate how certain emotional topics of discussion can make participants' social category memberships salient, and how these salient category memberships in turn can affect how people communicate about the topic.

Chapter 11, *Rewards and Risks of Exploring Negative Emotion: An Assimilation Model Account*, by Lara Honos-Webb, Linda Endres, Ayesha Shaikh, Elizabeth Harrick, James Lani, Lynne Knobloch, Michael Surko, and William Stiles, addresses the impact of expressing negative emotions on mental and physical health. They first describe their Assimilation Model (Stiles, Elliott, Llewelyn, Firth-Cozens, Margison, Shapiro, & Hardy, 1990), in which client's representations of negative or problematic experiences are hypothesized to move through a number of stages, from unacknowledged to fully integrated and mastered. Honos-Webb et al. describe two versions of the Assimilation model, one of which focuses on schema formation and the other of which focuses on how people integrate different "voices". They then present two cases studies of assimilation using excerpts from session transcripts to illustrate how clients' affective language shifts as they come to assimilate their experiences. In the next section of the paper, they report the results of a laboratory study of sharing emotions using a paradigm initiated by Pennebaker (e.g., 1997). In this study, students wrote for 20 minutes each of four days about their most traumatic emotional experience. In contrast to Pennebaker's previously findings, the students who had the most assimilation also had the most health-care visits in the short but not the long term. Honos-Webb and her colleagues speculate that the four day writing time might have been long enough to enable participants to uncover previously suppressed or unacknowledged emotional distress but failed to provide enough time or the proper supportive context for them to work through these issues. Their findings suggest that the expression of
traumatic experiences is most beneficial when it occurs in a supportive conversational context wherein people can learning coping strategies to assimilate these experiences.

In Chapter 12, *Blocking emotions: The face of resistance*, Kathleen Ferrara looks at the phenomenon of resistance, or the holding back of emotions, in a psychotherapeutic context. As in her earlier work (Ferrara, 1994), Ferrara uses a discourse-centered approach in which she looks closely at detailed transcripts of actual therapy sessions to determine how both client and therapist jointly construct resistance. She uses Labov and Fanshel's (1977) concepts of Repeated Requests, with which therapists can ask clients to do something, and Put Offs, by which clients can avoid meeting these requests. Ferrara describes discourse rules for making and putting-off direct and indirect requests, and shows how components of these requests (e.g., listeners need for the action, need for the request, ability to do the action, willingness to do the action, and so forth) can form the basis of put-offs. She provides a number of examples of Repeated Requests and Put Offs and then examines the conversational dynamics of a long sequence in which a client repeatedly puts off the therapist's request. The analyses show how the way in which the therapist phrases the request (indirectly) enables the client to continue his series of put-offs. Ferrara suggests that direct requests might lead to less resistance on the part of clients. Her work demonstrates how one's communicative partner can influence the ways in which emotions are expressed or (or fail to be expressed). She argues that by better understanding how clients and therapists co-construct conversation, therapists should be able to provide more effective therapy.

**Themes and Issues for Future Research**

As can be seen from the brief synopses above, contributors to this volume address a variety of issues in the verbal communication of emotion. Taken together, the chapters provide substantial insights into how people talk about affective experiences. In this section I outline some broad questions that arise from this body of work and some areas for future research.
What is the nature of the relationship between verbal and nonverbal communication of emotion?

Although contributions to this volume were limited to those focusing predominantly on the verbal communication of emotion, many chapters touch upon the impact of nonverbal and paralinguistic cues as well. This can be seen, for example, in the therapy session excerpts provided by Fiehler, Honos-Webb and colleagues, and Ferrara. In each case, nonverbal signs such as sighs, laughs, and the like, are incorporated into the written transcript. It seems clear that we, as readers of these transcripts, incorporate the transcribed nonverbal signs into our understanding of the emotional dynamics of the sessions. As Goddard and Fiehler argue, our interpretations of nonverbal signs may be shaped by cultural scripts specifying what behaviors are expected in particular settings. Quite a bit is known about the role of different nonverbal and paralinguistic cues to emotion (cf. (see, e.g., Ekman and Davidson, 1994, Feldman & Rime, 1991; Philippot, Feldman, & Coats, 1999; Russell & Fernandez-Dols, 1997; Scherer & Ekman, 1984). Yet, as Planalp and Knie point out, the ways in which we integrate nonverbal cues with verbal utterances is still poorly understood. Their chapter provides a number of suggestions for future research in this area.

An understanding of the ways verbal and nonverbal cues are integrated has become especially relevant today, now that new technologies allow for communication via text-based chat, email, and other media in which verbal communication is the primary channel of communication (e.g., Walther & Burgoon, 1992; Kiesler, Siegel, McGuire, 1984; Rice & Love, 1987). The use of emoticons such as smiley faces to indicate nonverbal cues to emotion in text-based media suggests that people believe that nonverbal cues are an important addition to their words when expressing emotion. A better understanding of how people integrate verbal and nonverbal cues in face-to-face settings would enable system designers to develop technologies to support emotional communication among remotely distributed parties.

Two of the chapters suggest that the relationship between verbal and nonverbal cues to affect may run deeper than their simultaneous use to express an ongoing emotional state. Both
Kovecses and Gibbs et al. provide examples showing that many metaphors for emotional states were originally rooted in bodily experiences (e.g., *hot under the collar*). Kovecses suggests that the similarity of conceptual metaphors across cultures may stem from the universality of the bodily components of emotional responses (e.g., getting flushed). The question thus arises as to whether the actual experiencing of nonverbal signs of emotional states influences the figurative expressions speakers choose to communicate those states.

**What are the relationships among felt emotions, cognitions and affective language?**

In part, an answer to the question of how verbal and nonverbal cues to emotion are integrated may depend on the nature of the relationship between felt emotions and their verbal communication. In some cases people talk about emotional experiences as they are happening, whereas at other times they relate their own and others' past emotional experiences (Rime et al.). The degree to which the original emotion is felt at the time of sharing may thus vary substantially. Because nonverbal cues to emotion are often a byproduct of the actual experience of an emotion, the ways these cues are integrated with verbal messages may differ depending on the extent to which the emotion is felt at the time of the utterance. Another, almost Whorfian (1956) angle on the emotion/language relationship is suggested at least indirectly by the chapters by some of the chapters. For example, McMullen and Conway suggest that by speaking about their emotions using the *DEPRESSION IS DESCENT* conceptual metaphor, people's feelings of sadness might worsen. Thus, there may be a bi-directional relationship between felt emotions and the verbal expression of these emotions which requires further investigation.

Likewise, a bi-directional relationship between cognition and emotional language is suggested by the chapters on social sharing of emotions (Rime et al), resistance (Ferrara), and assimilation (Honos-Web et al.). In each of these cases, it appears that expressing emotions to others has, in at least some cases, positive benefits for the speaker's cognitive views of the emotional circumstance. Honos-Webb and colleagues show, for example, how in a therapeutic context descriptions of an emotional experience come to reflect clients' greater assimilation of
that experience. Angus and Korman show how changes over time in clients’ selections of
metaphors from the RELATIONSHIPS ARE CONFLICT domain reflect changes in their
conceptualizations of their relationships. Furthermore, Ferrara and Rime et al. suggest that
failures to share emotions with others can, at least in some cases, lead to failure to resolve
negative experiences. Thus, another direction for future research would be to expand studies of
the relationships between affect and cognition (see, e.g., papers in Clark & Fiske, 1982; Eich et
al., 2000; Fiedler & Forgas, 1988; Izard, Kagan, & Zajonc, 1984) to the examination of
relationships among emotions, cognitions, and verbal affective communication.

To what extent are emotions and affective communication co-constructed by
speaking partners?

In the Rhetorical model described by Planalp and Knie, affective communication is
embedded in a social context which can shape its form, and this theme is addressed in a number
of the contributions to this volume. Honos-Webb and colleagues, for example, suggest that the
benefits of talking about emotions in their case studies stem in part from client's ability to work
the issues through with their therapist. Rime et al. also suggest that the sharing of emotions has
benefits by enabling people to work through their experiences. Conversational grounding (e.g.,
Clark, 1996) and perspective-taking (cf. Krauss and Fussell, 1996) models of communication
likewise suggest that how people formulate messages about emotional states will be influenced
by their partners' characteristics and responses.

One's communicative partner can influence affective communication in a number of
ways. First, as Rime points out, others' characteristics (particularly their relationship with the
speaker) is a determinant of who emotions will be shared with. In addition, as Pittam and
Gallois' contribution highlights, a partner's social category memberships can make the speaker
more aware of his or her own category memberships and thereby influence the way that an
emotion is discussed. Finally, Ferrara shows here and in her earlier book (Ferrara, 1994)
conversational partners' responses can impact how emotional messages are formulated.
A better understanding of the effects of conversational partners on affective communication is thus another area for future research, especially in the light of the previous section suggesting that there may be bi-directional relationships between how emotions are expressed and people's experiences of emotion and cognitions about emotional events.

How does culture influence emotional experience and affective communication?

Most all of the chapters touch at least indirectly on the role of socio-cultural processes in emotional communication. However, the impact of culture on emotional language remains somewhat unclear. On the one hand, several chapters describe cultural differences. For example, Goddard discusses the cultural embeddedness of the emotion lexicon as well as the role of culture in displaying emotions, Fiehler notes that there are cultural differences in rules for displaying emotions, responding to others' emotional displays, and interpreting emotions, Rime and colleagues found differences in patterns of sharing emotions between Western and Eastern cultures, and McMullen and Conway suggest that metaphors for depression are based in Western conceptualizations of the self. On the other hand, Kovecses argues that many conceptual metaphors for emotion are universal, perhaps because they are rooted in bodily manifestations of emotional experiences that are likely to be fairly constant across cultures. The ways in which culture shapes emotional expression are likely to be complex (cf. Kitayama & Markus, 1994) and require further study.

Conclusion

This volume brings together an international, interdisciplinary group of researchers focusing on the verbal communication of emotion. The contributions illustrate the value of authors' respective theoretical and empirical approaches for an understanding of affective language in both every day and clinical settings. Taken as a whole, the chapters provide a comprehensive look at the current state of research on the use of language in affective communication and suggest a number of interesting directions for future research.
References


