

The Ad Hominem argument against 'Knowledge is true belief': a reply to Martens

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In this article I will detail the short-comings that exist in the cognitive account of the emotion objectless fear, principally, though not exclusively, as it is presented in the work of William Lyons. I will use my critique of Lyons's causal-evaluative theory to act as a point of transition or pathway towards Heidegger's description of Angst as it is detailed in *Being and Time*. I argue that objectless fear cannot simply be dismissed as a mislabelled mood, as claimed by Martha Nussbaum or, as Lyons suggests, that its object is merely vague or imponderable. Rather, it is my contention that genuine objectless fear (or Angst) is best understood as an ontologically important means of revealing our authentic and inauthentic possibilities.

Keywords: emotion/mood analysis, objectless fear, Angst, cognition, causal-evaluative theory, Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, ontology

Horwich On The Leibnizian Ratio Against Absolute Space And Motion

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I will argue that Paul Horwich's classical reconstructions of the Leibnizian arguments against absolute space and absolute motion are flawed. First, I will introduce Newton's conception of space and motion, and Horwich's analysis of the Leibnizian response to Newton's argument. I will then present what, I think, is the correct interpretation of Leibniz's response to Newton. Next, I will explain why Horwich's stance probably follows from his imperfect understanding of Leibniz's notion of force. I will finally present Leibniz's positive argument for a relational conception of space, and maintain that, once again, Horwich is likely mistaken in his analysis of the argument, or rather of what the argument entails.

Keywords: absolute space, absolute motion, general equivalence of hypotheses, force, haecceitism

Supervenience And Reductive Physicalism

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Supervenience physicalism attempts to combine non-reductionism about properties with a physical determination thesis in such a way as to ensure physicalism. I argue that this attempt is unsuccessful: the specific supervenience relation in question is either strong enough to ensure reductionism, as in the case of strong supervenience, or too weak to yield physical determination, as in the case of global supervenience. The argument develops in three stages. First, I propose a distinction between two types of reductionism, definitional and scientific, a distinction thanks to which we can reply to a standard objection against the ontological reductionism of strong supervenience. Second, I claim that because of “the problem of random distribution,” global supervenience needs strengthening to be an adequate relation to capture our physicalistic intuitions; and I show, in accordance with Stalnaker’s relevant proof, why a natural strengthening of global supervenience renders it equivalent to strong supervenience. Finally, I argue against Stalnaker about the possibility of a non-reductionist global supervenience. The upshot is that despite appearances, supervenience physicalism is a form of reductive physicalism.

Keywords: global supervenience, strong supervenience, physicalism, reductionism, properties

Bundles, Individuation And Indiscernibility

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In a recent paper, Sun Demirli (2010) proposes an allegedly new way of conceiving of individuation in the context of the bundle theory of object constitution. He suggests that allowing for distance relations to individuate objects solves the problems with worlds containing indiscernible objects that would otherwise affect the theory. The aim of the present paper is i) To show that Demirli's proposal falls short of achieving this goal and ii) To carry out a more general critical assessment of the issue by appraising the costs and benefits of Demirli's view as well as of existing alternatives.

Keywords: Bundle theory, universal, instance, individuation, structure, relation, Identity of the Indiscernibles

Cognitive And Heideggerian Approaches To The Question: What Is The Object Of Objectless Fear?

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In this article I will detail the short-comings that exist in the cognitive account of the emotion objectless fear, principally, though not exclusively, as it is presented in the work of William Lyons. I will use my critique of Lyons's causal-evaluative theory to act as a point of transition or pathway towards Heidegger's description of Angst as it is detailed in *Being and Time*. I argue that objectless fear cannot simply be dismissed as a mislabelled mood, as claimed by Martha Nussbaum or, as Lyons suggests, that its object is merely vague or imponderable. Rather, it is my contention that genuine objectless fear (or Angst) is best understood as an ontologically important means of revealing our authentic and inauthentic possibilities.

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