Abstracts

THE SELF: A HUMEAN BUNDLE AND/OR A CARTESIAN SUBSTANCE?

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Is the self a substance, as Descartes thought, or is it ‘only’ a bundle of perceptions, as Hume thought? In this paper I will examine these two views, especially with respect to two central features that have played a central role in the discussion, both of which can be quickly and usefully explained if one puts them as an objection to the bundle view. First, friends of the substance view have insisted that only if one conceives of the self as a substance is it possible to account for genuine particularity of selves and genuine persistence through time of them. I will discuss in detail this claim as well as a special case of persistence - the case of a fission of a self - and I will ask, as Shoemaker (1997) did, how such a case can be handled by the two competing theories. The second central point of traditional disagreement concerns independence: it is often said that only a substance, but not a mere bundle, is independent enough of its properties to play properly the role of a self, and I will have something to say about this.

Concerning all these points, my thesis will be a meta-theoretical one: contrary to appearances, both views can accommodate all of them (particularity at a time, persistence, fission, independence) in the same way, and I will examine two possible conclusions to be drawn from this: either that the differences between the two views are no more than terminological and that they turn out to be equivalent views, or that the differences are metaphysical but that it is epistemically under-determined which one of the views we should choose.

Key words: self, bundle theory, substance, substratum, metaontology

EPISTEMICAL AND ETHICAL TROUBLES IN ACHIEVING RECONCILIATION, AND THEN BEYOND

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My optimism towards reconciliation in places like Bosnia and Kosovo has become increasingly guarded because of certain epistemical and ethical issues. Reconciliation presumes the making of moral judgments about a wrongdoing, judgments that are empirically informed. If the perceptual judgments that are used to do the informing are made suspect because of a lapse in the commonplace self-restraints (or controls) on reasoning or glitches in the regulative ideals or epistemic goods like understanding and intelligibility, then the moral judgments on which they are grounded become suspect as well. This happens to both fanatic and non-fanatic. In this article I explore these issues by starting with spousal-like relationships that must sort out the demands for truth, moral decency, and harmony. Sometimes epistemical difficulties preclude a couple from forgiveness and, thus, reconciliation, in which case harmony may only be achieved through a moral forgetfulness of the wrongdoing. The broader contention is that epistemical difficulties surrounding stories of competing ethno-national communities are even more imposing, thus making reconciliation ever so difficult. Although moral forgetfulness is sometimes used in spousal-like relationships in order to maintain harmony, it is more difficult to adopt within post-conflict situations between ethno-national adversaries, thus leading some to accept a separate co-existence as the last resort on the road to peace building.

Key words: commonplace self-restraints on reasoning, conscientiously held belief, epistemic goods, ethno-nationalism, fanatic, identity, moral forgetfulness, moral judgment, reconciliation, stories
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: INTERNATIONAL MORALITY OR GLOBAL IDEAL?

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Abstract

Drawing upon Strawson’s contrast between social morality and individual ideals, this paper develops a distinction between international morality and global ideals. International morality, it is argued, consists of rules regulating the conduct of those occupying the role of statesman. Thus the morality of coercive humanitarian intervention, for example, depends upon its conformity to these rules. Much recent thought on this issue, however, justifies intervention in terms of some global ideal, of which there are many, and this, it is claimed, is a mistake.

Key words: ethics; intervention; role; statesman.

CONTEXTUALISM WITHOUT INCOMPLETENESS

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After summarizing the main intuitions and lines of reasoning at the basis of contextualism, I focus on the so-called Incompleteness Argument. I examine the discussion and rejection of this argument by Cappelen and Lepore (2005) and recognize that there are indeed some puzzling aspects to the intuition upon which the argument is based. After discussing why the incompleteness intuition seems to apply arbitrarily and be liable to infinite regress, and how it may have originated, I conclude that it is a misleading response to the situatedness of our speech and that it can be explained away without rejecting contextualism.

Key words: context, contextualism, semantic incompleteness, truth-conditions, truth-evaluation